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Abstract
The 2002 presidential election in South Korea was seen by some commentators as 
a 'generational earthquake'. It was argued that younger voters, defi ned as those 
belonging to the 20–30 age groups, had become more mobilized and active than 
in any previous election, and that consequently the persistent regionalism that 
had characterized South Korean national elections for so long was fi nally at an 
end. It was also claimed that the 2002 election marked a repositioning of ideology 
and policy preferences at centre stage. The present article, however, argues that 
while ideology and policy preferences did indeed assume greater importance, 
and while generational issues also came to the fore, yet the predominant factor in 
the 2002 election remained – as in previous presidential elections in South Korea 
– a persistent, almost static, regional voting pattern. 
Introduction
At the time of writing in December 2003, the current South Korean 
president, Roh Mu-hyun, has just been defeated by a two-thirds majority 
in his attempt to veto a law passed by the National Assembly to appoint 
a Special Prosecutor to investigate allegations of corruption.1 In addition, 
Roh's call for a national referendum to be held in mid-December on the 
nation's confi dence in him as leader has been put on hold. 
There have been a number of events leading up to the present situation. 
First was the president's resignation as a member of the ruling Millen-
nium Democratic Party, under whose banner he was elected president 
in December 2002. Second, there have been a number of corruption cases 
among the higher echelons of government. Finally, and no doubt as a direct 
consequence, the president has witnessed a marked drop in his approv-
als rating as leader – from 80 percent immediately after his inauguration 
to less than 30 percent in October 2003. In addition, while initially hopes 
were high that relations between the government and workers would 
see a marked improvement under Roh, a series of large-scale strikes have 
undermined confi dence that this will in fact happen. 
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These events have all but paralyzed the Roh administration, not only 
in its attempts to enhance inter-Korean relations through the Peace and 
Prosperity Policy but also to drive through measures for continued eco-
nomic growth in South Korea.2 Foreign and economic policy in Korea is 
very much controlled by the president, who presently lacks a majority 
in the National Assembly, and is thereby greatly constrained in his ef-
forts as leader to make progress in both economic and political arenas. 
Indeed Roh has to a great extent been sidetracked by the time he has 
been obliged to spend defending himself against allegations of corrup-
tion. He has therefore been unable to provide the leadership necessary to 
pursue the possibilities for increased economic and political exchanges 
between the south and the north after the 2000 Summit between Kim 
Dae-jung and Kim Jong-Il. The 'lame duck' status of the president has 
also meant that the economic reforms begun after the 1997 fi nancial crisis 
have ground to a halt, as Roh has failed to get the necessary legislation 
passed, owing to his acrimonious relationship with the opposition.
However, the situation is certainly not a new one: other South Korean 
presidents have resigned from their parties, in fact every president elected 
since 1987 has chosen to resign from the ruling party. Often this has hap-
pened during the fi nal year of the presidential tenure for a couple of 
reasons: fi rst, so that the president may offi cially adopt a neutral stance 
vis-à-vis the deliberations for a new presidential candidate and, second, 
so that he may head a non-partisan government during the election year. 
Roh Tae-woo (1988-93), the fi rst post-transition president, promised at the 
time of his inauguration that he would hold a referendum on his poli-
cies at mid-term. So although Roh did not fulfi l this promise, this does 
at least set a precedent for holding a referendum on the performance of 
the president. However, we are only one year into Roh Mu-hyun's presi-
dential tenure, and he is a president without signifi cant party support 
in the National Assembly, in a presidential system not well disposed to 
accommodating such uneasy bedfellows. The previous president, Kim 
Dae-jung, also headed a minority government, and as a consequence saw 
most of his reforms blocked by the National Assembly. By the end of his 
tenure, Kim also had witnessed a signifi cant erosion of his popularity due 
to several corruption cases involving not only close advisers but also his 
sons. Consequently in his last year in offi ce, Kim became effectively a lame 
duck. In addition, as the South Korean constitution does not allow for a 
second term, political loyalties tend to shift from the incumbent president 
to leading candidates for the ruling party nomination. However, as Roh 
Muh-hyun has spent only one year in the Blue House and lacks majority 
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support in the National Assembly, the political and economic reforms 
that he initiated are fast running out of steam.
Roh Mu-hyun was the surprise winner of an election which some 
commentators viewed as a 'generational earthquake'.3 Other commen-
tators see things differently; they argue that it testifi es to a 'widening 
ideological gap' in South Korean politics and that political preferences 
are fi nally beginning to infl uence voter choice.4 In 2001, the vast majority 
of political commentators expected Lee Hoi-chang, leader of the con-
servative Grand National Party and runner-up in the 1997 election, to 
carry the day come election; after all, opinion polls clearly showed him 
as the people's favourite no matter who stood against him. Even as late 
as six weeks before the 19 December election, a survey conducted by 
the daily newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, showed Lee ahead of the runner-up, 
Chung Mong-joon of the National Alliance 21, by more than 13 points.5
The survey indicated that even if Chung Mong-joon and Roh Mu-hyun 
(who was standing for the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and 
was then in third place) were able to reach agreement and come up with 
a joint candidate, Lee Hoi-chang would still win the election.
Although democratic national elections are often seen as an opportu-
nity to 'vote the rascals' out of offi ce, in fact they serve multiple purposes: 
as conduits to power and as the aggregation of public preferences. As 
such, it is expected that the voter will make their choice based to a large 
extent on political preferences.6 However, historically, elections in South 
Korea have always been decided not on the policies of the candidates, 
but on regional preferences. In fact, since the fi rst post-transition elec-
tion in December 1987, and even before that, there has been a persistent, 
almost static, regional voting pattern where voters are swayed not by 
the political views and policies of the candidates, but by their regional 
origin.7 Combined with a signifi cantly higher turnout by older voters and 
an electoral system heavily weighted towards rural voters, this lock-in 
of a sizeable percentage of the votes augured success for the conserva-
tive ruling party candidates coming from the most populous provinces, 
the Kyungsang Provinces, in both the 1987 and 1992 elections. While 
structural and class issues of course should come to the fore in a country 
as highly industrialized as Korea,  repression during the authoritarian 
period (1961-87) prevented any labour-based party from participating 
in the National Assembly or in the few presidential elections that were 
held during that period.8 Labour candidates have participated in elec-
tions since 1987, but in most cases they received less than 2 percent of 
the vote, and consequently the parties were dissolved by law.9
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Although we saw a power alternation in 1997 with perennial oppo-
sition candidate Kim Dae-jung winning the election, that election too 
underlined yet again the importance of regional origins as Kim Dae-jung 
received more than 90 percent of the votes in his home province, and he 
was only able to clinch the victory due to a fragmented opposition and 
a coalition with another regionally based party led by Kim Jong-pil.10
The presidential election in 2002, on the face of it, promised to be 
different. None of the major candidates seemed to have the same re-
gional pull as the three Kims and none of the candidates in fact stood 
as candidate for a party traditionally based in his home region.11 It was 
therefore expected that the sway of regionalism would be signifi cantly 
diminished and that the 2002 election would serve as a watershed in the 
way elections would henceforth be fought and won in South Korea.
Through a detailed analysis of the 2002 election, this article inves-
tigates if behind the surprising victory by Roh Mu-hyun there was in 
fact a 'generational earthquake', a sign of the 'widening ideological gap' 
in Korean politics, or if we must look elsewhere to fi nd the root causes 
for Roh's victory. The article argues that while the election showed evi-
dence of a generational voting pattern, in addition to the emergence 
an ideological cleavage, yet these two factors alone cannot explain the 
outcome of the election. While these developments certainly infl uenced 
Roh's victory, as in previous presidential elections in South Korea, the 
most indicative explanation remains that of the regional voting pattern. 
Nonetheless, the evidence does suggest that if the current developments 
continue, we may soon witness a diminution in the importance of re-
gional voting in South Korea and the establishment of a policy-based 
institutionalized party system. 
Shifting Patterns? The 2002 Election
It was not at all certain that Roh Mu-Hyun would be nominated as 
the ruling Millennium Democratic Party's (MDP) candidate for the 
2002 election. In fact, Rhee In-je, who had run against Kim Dae-jung 
in 1997 and joined the MDP in 1998, was considered by many as a 
much more credible candidate. However, as the different factions 
within the ruling party could not reach a consensus, and seeking to 
expand democracy within the party, Kim Dae-jung agreed to let the 
MDP change the nomination rules toward an American-style primary. 
Consequently in January 2002,  70,000 delegates (half of whom were from 
the party membership and half randomly selected from the populace 
at large) participated in nationwide primaries. The initial handful of 
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candidates was, through intra-party competition, soon narrowed down 
to two candidates: Roh Mu-hyun, a human rights lawyer with scant 
experience of national not to mention international politics, and Rhee 
In-je, a politician better known for frequently changing parties than for 
his policies. However, Rhee soon withdrew from the race amid persistent 
rumours that the president was behind the candidacy of Roh. Rhee's 
problem was that he was simply unable to match Roh's regional support; 
moreover he soon came under pressure from party leaders who doubted 
his ability to win against Lee Hoi-chang.12
Although Roh Mu-hyun was respected for his honesty and work for 
human rights, he did not have signifi cant experience in government. 
In January 2002, as the race for the presidency was only just begin-
ning to warm up, Roh was more than 25 percentage points behind the 
leader, Lee Hoi-chang, who enjoyed a far higher profi le as a politician. 
However, the increasing and mainly favourable attention by the media 
on the ruling party nomination process meant that by February Roh 
was becoming better known. Furthermore his key supporters, known 
as 'The 386 Generation', began to use the internet to publicize their po-
litical views and drum up support for Roh.13 Unlike the elections held 
before the Asian crisis of 1997, the 2002 election witnessed, in common 
with the 1997 election to a certain degree, only limited usage of large 
outdoor rallies by both the ruling party and the opposition.14 Instead the 
opposing camps attempted to take advantage of the widespread use of 
the internet in South Korea (South Korea had the highest penetration 
rate in the world). In particular, Roh's young advisers began to see the 
advantage of using this as an instrument to reach potential voters. 15
The purpose was to target those segments of society that surveys in-
dicated as more favourably inclined towards the liberal views of Roh.16
An internet site established in the spring of 2000, Nosamo.org ('people 
who love Roh Mu-hyun'), initially counted just 300 members, but by 
May 2002 the fi gure had grown to more than 36,000. The site was used 
not only to promote Roh's ideas and policies, but also to mobilize people's 
support for the nomination campaign; indeed, this was a major factor 
behind Roh's success in winning the ruling party nomination at the end 
of April. After that time, the people running the site began to focus their 
attention on younger voters, in an attempt to motivate them to turn out 
at the polls come December. In fact, the site was so successful in raising 
interest that by December the site had more than half a million hits a day 
and Roh was receiving through the site more than 7,000 emails a day.
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However, events took a different turn when it emerged that several 
close advisers to Kim Dae-jung, and even his two sons, had been in-
volved in corruption scandals. Local elections saw the Grand National 
Party (GNP) crushing the ruling party as most mayoral and guberna-
torial posts were won by the GNP.17 The election also had the lowest 
turnout thus far recorded in South Korea, and by the autumn 2002 all 
surveys still showed Roh lagging behind not only Lee Hoi-chang but 
also Chung Mong-joon, a new candidate on the political scene.18 Chung 
Mong-joon was son of the Hyundai chaebŏl founder and the richest 
member of the National Assembly, and he sought to capitalize on the 
existing status and recognition he already enjoyed as head of the Korean 
Football Association, and on the visibility he had gained during the very 
successful 2002 World Cup.19 By mid-September Chung, as leader of 
the newly organized National Unity 21, was running in second place in 
the polls and was only half a percentage point behind the front-runner, 
Lee Hoi-chang, but comfortably ahead of the ruling party's candidate 
Roh Mu-hyun. Realizing that he would not be able to beat Lee single-
handedly, by September he had begun discussions with Roh to see if 
they could agree on a joint candidate. Despite a series of negotiations, 
the two parties failed to reach an agreement, and fearful of dividing the 
liberal vote (in the way that Lee Hoi-chang and Rhee In-je had split the 
conservative vote in 1997 and Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam the 
liberal one in 1987, in both cases leading to defeat), Roh Mu-hyun and 
Chung Mong-joon decided to take the matter to the people through a 
number of polls following a televised debate.20
The talks over the format of the televised debate and the polls, 
however, hit a snag on 18 November, as National Unity 21 demanded 
that a key negotiator from the MDP, who had leaked the planned date of 
the polls, be removed from further talks.21 Chung Mong-joon also took 
issue with the wording of the poll question. Fearing Roh's eloquence, the 
Chung camp had demanded that the question be asked in such a way 
that would indicate voter preference for the candidate, rather than who 
the voters thought had won the televised debate. It was on 22 November, 
after these issues had been resolved, that the debate was held.22 Post-
debate surveys conducted by the media indicated that the two were 
running neck and neck, and the three days between the televised 
debate and the poll taking were spent on vigorous campaigning, 
mainly in the Cholla Provinces which were seen as key to victory in 
the polls.23 After a series of secret opinion polls conducted in the days 
immediately after the debate, it was announced that Roh Mu-hyun 
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FIGURE 1: 2002 Presidential Election Surveys (main candidates)
Sources: Korea Gallup, Media Release 136 (2002); Media Research (2002).
would stand as the joint candidate. Surveys carried out immediately 
after the announcement showed a signifi cant jump in support for Roh. 
Consequently the GNP changed its campaign strategy in an attempt to 
emphasize the ideological differences between the liberal Roh and the 
conservative GNP candidate.24 The announcement that Roh would be 
the joint candidate established him almost overnight at the front-runner 
in the surveys, a position that he would retain until election day.
In contrast to the nomination process of the ruling MDP, it had 
never been in doubt that Lee Hoi-chang would become the GNP's 
candidate even after losing the presidential election in 1997 to Kim 
Dae-jung. Consequently, on 10 May Lee was offi cially declared his 
party's presidential candidate. Fearing the established support Lee 
commanded among the voters, the ruling MDP, as in 1997, again 
attempted to undermine his popularity by raising the issue of Lee's 
sons having avoided military service on the grounds that they were 
underweight.25 The MDP even charged that people close to Lee had 
attempted to cover up the illegal evasion of military service by bribing 
military offi cials. Although offi cial investigations indicated that these 
allegations might prove to be unfounded, they nonetheless, as in 1997, 
damaged Lee's reputation especially among younger voters who were 
tired of the sons of the rich avoiding compulsory military service. In 
contrast, Roh Mu-hyun saw a signifi cant increase in his support among 
younger votes during the three weeks prior to the election, and by late 
November surveys showed him supported by 55 percent of those in the 
20-29 age cohort and by 50 percent of the 30-39 age cohort.26 This shift 
was important as voters in their twenties and thirties constituted more 
than 48 percent of the electorate.27
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However, while Roh saw his support among younger voters rise, in 
South Korea, as in most industrialized democracies, younger voters tend 
to have signifi cantly lower turnout rates, making an effi cient campaign 
to reach these age groups vital to the success of the Roh campaign.28
Taking advantage of the high penetration rate of the internet in South 
Korea, the Roh camp sought to use this as an instrument to reach out 
to younger voters.29
There were two principal reasons for the rise in Roh's popularity among 
younger voters: fi rst, the agreement between Roh and Chung Mong-joon 
on a joint candidate, and second, the signifi cant anti-American sentiment 
among younger voters due to the killing of two young school-girls by an 
armoured vehicle driven by two US servicemen. Roh was much more able, 
and willing, to score political points from the public outcry at the failure to 
prosecute the two US soldiers in a South Korean court and their subsequent 
acquittal in a US military court. Roh's campaign speeches, which as the 
campaign heated up in the autumn of 2002, began increasingly to question 
South Korea's ties with the US, were well received by many, especially 
younger voters. Surveys showed that not only were a majority of younger 
voters increasingly liberal in their political viewpoints, they were also more 
inclined to be anti-American than older voters.30 Although Lee Hoi-chang 
tried also to clamber aboard this platform, even demanding a 'personal 
apology' from the US president, Roh, who in the 1980s and 1990s had called 
for the complete removal of US troops from South Korea, came across with 
far more credibility on the issue that his more established conservative 
opponent.31 Roh also declared that he would not travel to Washington to 
'kowtow' to the US president, and that he would, if elected, continue the 
Sunshine Policy begun under Kim Dae-jung. The Sunshine Policy enjoyed 
signifi cant support in the population at large, but especially among younger 
voters who increasingly refused to see North Korea as a military threat.32
These voters insisted on a more conciliatory tone in relations with North 
Korea. Many of them were deeply infl uenced by US inaction during the 
suppression of the people's uprising in May 1980 in Kwangju and they 
viewed US infl uence in South Korea as a relic of the Cold War. 
The agreement between Chung Mong-joon and Roh Mu-hyun had 
stipulated that whoever lost at the polls should subsequently actively 
support the campaign of the winner. However Chung, while pledging 
to fi ght against Lee, gave lukewarm support at best to Roh's campaign, 
despite numerous pleas from the Roh camp. Chung then, only a few 
hours before the end of the offi cial campaign period, abruptly withdrew 
his support from Roh. However, this does not seem to have damaged 
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Roh's prospects at the polls, indeed it might even have helped him, as 
his supporters became even more determined to turn out to vote. And 
while the announcement by North Korea in mid-December that it would 
reactivate its nuclear programs would, under normal circumstances, 
increase the conservative vote and play into the hands of Lee Hoi-chang, 
surveys conducted in the days after the North Korean announcement 
showed only minuscule changes in voter support.33
The election on 19 December 2002 saw the lowest ever turnout for a 
presidential election in South Korea and so continued a trend initiated 
at the fi rst post-transition election (Table 1). 
TABLE 1: Voter Turnout at Post-Transition Presidential Elections
Year 1987 1992 1997 2002
Voter turnout (%) 89.9 81.9 80.7 70.8
Sources: Ch'oi 1996: 401; National Election Commission at http://www.nec.go.kr
Even Kwangju and the Cholla provinces, which constituted the main 
support base of the MDP, although still above the national average, 
witnessed a signifi cant drop in voter turnout compared to 1997 (Table 2).
TABLE 2: Voter Turnout (%) at Presidential Elections in Kwangju and 
the Cholla Provinces (1997 and 2002)
Area/Year 1997 2002
Kwangju 89.9 78.1
South Cholla Province 87.3 76.4
North Cholla Province 85.5 74.6
Source: National Election Commission at http://www.nec.go.kr
Winning the election with 48.9 percent of the vote against Lee's 46.6 
percent, the election continued another trend that fi rst began in 1987, 
namely that of electing a president with less than a majority of the votes.34
Leading a minority government in a presidential system not designed 
to accommodate such a situation, Roh found himself from the outset 
sailing in rough waters. Indeed, throughout his fi rst year in offi ce, he 
has been fi ghting an uphill battle to get his policies through a National 
Assembly controlled by a GNP out for revenge after their defeat in the 
presidential election.
Table 3 seems to establish that compared to Kim Dae-jung in 1997, 
the Roh camp was in a far better position to appeal to, and mobilize, 
the younger voters. 
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TABLE 3: Longitudinal Comparison of Electoral Choice by Age Cohort
Age 
Cohort
Kim Dae-jung
1997
Lee Hoi-chang 
1997
Lee Hoi-chang
2002
Roh Mu-hyun
2002
20-29 43.2 27.9 31.7 62.1
30-39 43.7 34.8 33.9 59.3
40-49 37.2 44.1 48.7 47.4
50+ 34.2 51.0 58.3 39.8
Sources: Hangukgaellŏp josa yŏnguso 1998:19; MBC-TV exit poll published in The Korea Herald, 
20 December 2002 (internet edition).
Tables 4 and 5 also suggest that regional sentiment was an even more 
important factor than age in the candidates' home regions. There is, for 
instance, hardly any difference across age in the support for Roh Mu-
hyun in his home region of Kwangju/Cholla Provinces. However, the 
evidence also indicates that Roh was able to expand his appeal among 
younger voters especially in the larger cities, but also to a lesser degree 
even in areas where voters in general supported Lee Hoi-chang. Lee, on 
the other hand, was clearly unable to convince elderly voters in Roh's 
home region to support him. 
TABLE 4: Cross-tabulation of Regional Votes by Age Cohort (Roh 
Mu-hyun)
Region/Age Cohort 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+
Seoul 70.6 60.7 40.9 38.8
Inchŏn/Kyunggi Province 61.0 65.1 40.6 27.4
Kangwon Province 79.5 48.6 32.1 26.1
Taegu/Ch'ungchong Province 66.8 58.4 53.3 35.5
Kwangju/Cholla Province 97.5 86.7 93.7 92.7
Taegu/North Kyungsang Province 30.7 37.0 15.5 8.7
Pusan/Ulsan/South Kyungsang Province 49.2 47.5 30.9 11.6
Chejudo 66.7 78.4 56.7 25.0
Source: See Table 5.
However, the fact that the year 2002 witnessed the lowest ever 
turnout at a presidential election, and that the drop was across all age 
groups, means that the mobilization of younger voters hardly suffi ces 
as an explanation as to why Roh was able to win the election. As Table 
6 and Figure 2 indicate, any explanation for the 2002 election outcome 
must take into account the same regional voting pattern as in previous 
elections. In fact, it was the regional voting pattern, as evidenced in the 
city of Kwangju and the Cholla Provinces, where approximately 90 
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TABLE 6: Longitudinal Comparison of Regional Voting Pattern
1992: Percentage votes
Kim Young-sam Kim Dae-jung
Home region 70.1 92.2
Outside home region 31.1 22.7
National average 41.9 33.8
1997: Percentage votes
Kim Dae-jung Lee Hoi-chang
Home region 94.7 61.7
Outside home region 29.6 28.1
National average 40.3 38.7
2002: Percentage votes
Roh Mu-hyun Lee Hoi-chang
Home region 93.4 71.4
Outside home region 41.3 34.8
National average 48.9 46.6
Sources: Taehan Minguk Jŏngbu [Government of the Republic of Korea] 1993, 1988. The National 
Election Commission at http://www.nec.go.kr. 
TABLE 5: Cross-tabulation of Regional Votes by Age Cohort (Lee Hoi-
chang)
Region/Age Cohort 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+
Seoul 21.2 29.8 53.7 59.0
Inchŏn/Kyunggi Province 31.6 29.3 53.0 70.9
Kangwon Province 13.7 32.2 65.0 70.8
Taegu/Ch'ungchong Province 25.6 31.1 41.1 61.7
Kwangju/Cholla Province 0.0 8.4 4.7 6.9
Taegu/North Kyungsang Province 61.1 52.1 82.2 90.1
Pusan/Ulsan/South Kyungsang 
Province
44.2 46.4 63.1 86.6
Chejudo 16.4 14.3 43.3 75.0
Source: Calculations based on surveys published in Hanguk gaellŏp josa yŏnguso 2003. 
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percent of voters across all age groups supported Roh, combined with 
his ability to appeal to younger voters even outside his home region, 
that won him the election.
Figure 2 establishes without question that a regional voting pattern 
has persisted since 1987, with Kim Dae-jung in 1987, 1992, and in 1997 
dominating the Cholla Provinces and the city of Kwangju. While these 
areas are considered to have been, and remain, more liberally inclined in 
political orientation than other provinces, ideological preferences alone 
hardly can explain the overwhelming support that Kim, and now Roh, 
received in these areas. It is interesting to note that the loyal support 
enjoyed by Kim Dae-jung in these areas through three presidential 
elections, was transferred, at Kim's request, to Roh as the presidential 
candidate of the party founded by Kim.
FIGURE 2: Regional Voting Pattern: Kim Dae-jung (1987, 1992, and 
1997) and Roh Mu-hyun (2002)
The evidence clearly disproves that Roh's victory was due solely to a 
generational and ideological divide. Undoubtedly, a major factor remains 
the persistent regional voting pattern that has fi gured signifi cantly in 
all elections in South Korea since the democratic transition in 1987, be 
they National Assembly or presidential elections.
Source: National Election Commission at http://www.nec.go.kr
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Conclusion
Although the 2002 election saw a similar regional voting pattern to earlier 
elections, the stark generational split in the candidates' support base will 
most likely continue to change the way the South Korean government 
views the world. From the viewpoint of foreign affairs, the country has 
shown that it will not uncritically follow the lead of the United States, 
especially on vital issues such as relations with North Korea. The 386 
Generation has arrived in South Korean politics and, deeply infl uenced 
by their experience of the struggle for democracy in the 1980s, they are 
increasingly moving into positions of infl uence.
The evidence seems to suggest that while younger voters keen on 
political change defi nitely tempered regionalism in the 2002 election, 
yet turnout rates among those in their twenties remained low at only 
47.5 percent in 2002 compared to 68 percent in 1997, while the turnout 
rate for those in their thirties was 68.2 percent in 2002 compared to 82.6 
in 1997. While the internet defi nitely helped to generate interest in Roh, 
surveys conducted after the election indicate that the traditional media 
– television and newspapers – still were the sources people turned to 
when they wanted to learn about the presidential candidates.35 In addition, 
the less than impressive turnout rate of younger voters indicates only 
partial success in mobilizing this segment of the population. However, 
this may be part of a general trend, as indicated by Table 1, which reveals 
that presidential elections in Korea are seeing a signifi cant drop in voter 
turnout across all age groups.36
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) have in their seminal work warned 
us not to fall for the 'electoral fallacy'.37 By that they mean that although 
free, open and fair elections are a necessary condition for democracy, 
they are not a sufficient condition. Further necessary conditions, 
but not suffi cient ones, include institutionalized representation and 
accountability, as Scott Mainwaring (1999) argues in his work on Brazil. 
Representation will often take place through political parties, but when 
these remain weakly institutionalized, personalism tends to dominate 
electoral campaigns and outcomes.38 This will in turn lead to weakened 
accountability. A consequence of this can be a 'delegative' democracy, 
defi ned by Guillermo O'Donnell as having four main characteristics: (i) 
a high degree of personalism, (ii) considerable power invested in the 
executive, (iii) weak institutions, and (iv) weak mechanisms of horizontal 
oversight.39 However, the endemic splits among the political parties, and 
their uneasy coexistence within the National Assembly seem to suggest 
that Korea is headed towards an extended period marked by a political 
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impasse. Indeed, surveys indicate that the coming National Assembly 
election in April 2004 will fail to deliver a working majority for the 
president, and there are no signs that the opposition will abandon its 
policy of blocking all initiatives coming from the president. 
The 2002 presidential election proved without a doubt that electoral 
democracy has now entered the mainstream political process in Korea. 
However, it also showed that Korean democracy has yet to become 
fully consolidated. There are a number of indications that point in this 
direction. First, a signifi cant element of the political establishment, 
symbolized by the United Liberal Democrats led by Kim Jong-pil, 
remains unconvinced that the presidential system is the best one for 
a country such as Korea. Second, while there are indications of the 
increased importance of ideological and policy preferences, elections 
continue to show a persistent regional voting pattern. Third, the National 
Security Law, while used much more infrequently now against political 
opposition, remains on the statute books, thereby placing restrictions 
on free participation and inclusiveness. Fourth, although there remains 
strong support for democracy in principle, there are signs of a decrease 
in trust in democratic institutions, especially in the National Assembly. 
Finally, there was in 2002 widespread disregard for electoral rules and 
regulations, especially with regard to campaign expenses.40
One consequence of the presidential system and persistent regionalism 
is the lack of real institutionalization of political parties, as evidenced by the 
recent split of the MDP. The simple plurality presidential system currently 
used in South Korea does not encourage the institutionalization of parties, 
as winning has remained a question of regional origin and personality. 
In conclusion, as with earlier presidential elections, and in fact also at 
National Assembly Elections, the decisive factor at the 2002 presidential 
election was a persistent regional voting pattern. Any movements towards 
cross-regional alliances and coalitions have traditionally been based not on 
policy convergence between different political parties, but on the need of 
regionally based political leaders to expand their electoral base outside their 
home region. However, the 2002 presidential election did indicate movement 
towards the establishment of a clear generational divide, demonstrating that 
the political spectrum has broadened considerably. Thus, while it may not 
have been a 'generational earthquake', yet the election defi nitely served as 
an important watershed in electoral politics in South Korea.
Carl J. Saxer is Assistant Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University 
of Copenhagen. He received his D.Phil from the University of Oxford.
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NOTES
1 The president announced on 13 December that if a special independent investigation 
were to establish that he received illegal campaign contributions exceeding by one-
tenth the amount collected illegally by the main opposition, he would resign as 
president. Chosun Ilbo, 14 December 2003.
2 Peace and Prosperity Policy is the new name for what in reality is nothing but the 
continuation of Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy.
3 Financial Times, 23 December 2002, US edition: 8.
4 See for instance Hoon Jaung (2003: 8). 
5 Chosun Ilbo, 11 November 2002 (internet edition).
6 For an interesting recent collection of papers on political parties, see Richard Gunther, 
José Ramón Montero and Juna J. Linz (eds) (2002).
7 It is quite normal for candidates to enjoy a certain regional home advantage. However, 
the regional voting pattern in Korea has seen Kim Dae-jung receive more than 90 
percent of the votes in his home region, the Cholla Provinces and the city of Kwangju, 
in every election since 1987.
8 Direct presidential elections were held in 1963, 1967 and 1971. A close call in 1971 against 
Kim Dae-jung, saw President Park Chung-hee change the constitution to an indirect 
election by electoral college. The year 1987 witnessed the free direct election for president; 
it was also the year when the regional voting pattern was in evidence for the fi rst time.
9 The T'onghab sŏngŏ pŏb [The Unifi ed Election Law] mandates that political parties 
receiving less than 2 percent of the votes be dissolved. 
10 For a detailed analysis of the 1997 election, see Saxer (2002).
11 By the three Kims is meant Kim Young-sam (r. 1993-98) from the Kyungsang provinces, Kim 
Dae-jung (r. 1998-2002) from the Cholla Provinces, and Kim Jong-pil from the Chungchong 
Provinces. Those three have dominated politics in South Korea for decades. Lee Hoi-chang 
was born in Hwanghae Province in present-day North Korea, but was seen as a member 
of the Seoul-based establishment, and Roh Mu-hyun, while born in South Kyungsang 
Province, was standing for a party which had its roots in the Cholla Provinces.
12 Rhee In-je later in May joined the United Liberal Democrats and called for support 
for a constitutional revision towards a parliamentary system. 
13 The generation know as the 386 Generation was born in 1960s, went to college in 
the 1980s, and were in 2002 in their thirties or early forties. It is a generation deeply 
infl uenced by the struggle for democracy in the 1980s. 
14 The 1997 presidential election saw 49 large outdoor rallies, while in 2002 less than fi ve 
were held. The Korea Herald, 19 December 2002 (internet edition). 
15 See The New York Times, 5 May  2003, p. C4.
16 A poll conducted among opinion leaders by the Joongang Ilbo indicated that the voters' 
attitudes, with the exception of those in their fi fties and sixties, had shifted towards 
the liberal centre. See Joongang Ilbo, 11 February 2003 (internet edition). 
17 Chosun Ilbo, 13 June 2002 (internet edition).
18 A Chosun Ilbo and Korea Gallup survey gave Lee Hoi-chang 31.3 percent, Chung 
Mong-joon 30.8 percent, and Roh Mu-hyun came in third with 16.8 percent. Survey 
quoted in Chosun Ilbo, 22 September 2002 (internet edition). 
19 His father had run in 1992 and come third in the race won by Kim Young-sam.
20 In 1997 Kim Dae-jung received 40.3 percent of the votes against Lee Hoi-chang's 38.7 
percent. Rhee In-je came a distant third with 19.2 percent. For detailed discussions of 
the 1987 and 1997 elections, see Saxer (2002).
21 Joongang Ilbo, 19 November 2002 (internet edition). The fi ve National Unity 21 members 
of the negotiations committee quit their posts, arguing that the leak by the MDP 
negotiators had invalidated the agreement. They also accused the MDP of distorting 
the survey question.
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22 Joongang Ilbo, 23 November 2002 (internet edition).
23 Ibid.
24 An opinion poll taken by the Munhwa Ilbo and the cable channel YTN showed Roh now 
leading Lee with 48.2 percent against 39.1 percent. See The Korea Times, 26 November 
2002 (internet edition). With the announcement of Roh as a joint candidate, Lee Hoi-
chang saw the election as 'a duel between conservatives and progressives', The Korea 
Times, 26 November 2002 (internet edition).
25 When the rumours fi rst surfaced in 1997, Lee Hoi-chang claimed that one son was thin 
because of gastroenteritis and the other because he was at that time preparing his PhD 
dissertation in the US. However, this convinced very few people. In an attempt at heading 
off more damage to his reputation, Lee was forced to express regret over the controversy 
surrounding his two sons' military service. Within a few weeks of the allegations, Lee's 
popularity rating dropped more than 7 percent. See Hangukgaellŏp josa yŏnguso [Korean 
Gallup Poll] (1998). The drop was particularly large among people in their twenties and 
thirties. Again in 2002 when the accusations were aired, the result was a drop, this time 
less than 2 percent, in Lee's popularity. Korea Gallup, News Release 136, 2002.  
26 Survey conducted by the daily newspaper Chosun Ilbo and Korea Gallup on 22 
November 2002. 
27 The Korea Times, 13 December 2002 (internet edition).
28 On the turnout rate of different age groups, see also Lee Nam Young (2002).
29 On internet penetration in South Korea, see Chamberlin (2001: 67-70).
30 On the political views of students in particular, see Bae Han-dong (2001). On younger 
voters' attitudes towards the US, see Watts (2002). 
31 Chosun Ilbo, 6 December 2002 (internet edition).
32 More than 70 percent of the population supported the Sunshine Policy. See Watts (2002).
33 See Figure 1 and also Media Research, 19 December 2002.
34 In 1997 the difference between the winner, Kim Dae-jung, and the runner-up, Lee 
Hoi-chang, was only 1.6 percent with Kim receiving 40.3 percent of the votes.
35 Yun Seongyi (2003: 217).
36 National Assembly elections have also seen signifi cant drops in turnout since the fi rst 
post-transition election in 1988.
37 Linz and Stepan (1996: 4).
38 Mainwaring (1999: 322).
39 Ibid.: 328.
40 On trust in democratic institutions, see Shin Doh-Chull (1999). 
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